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ARGUMENT ONE 
THE APPELLEE'S BRIEF DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE AND MUST BE STRICKEN 
As noted in the Red Brief, the Appellee does not get past the first page before she violates 
the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure. 
Her gratuitous statement is clearly intended to invoke the sympathies of this Court as if 
something as important as the custody of minor children should be at all based upon one feeling 
sorry for the Appellee. 
Counsel would normally let this obvious attempt of the Appellee go unchallenged, as 
surely Counsel does not want to appear as less than compassionate, however, the statement is 
flagrantly misleading and untrue, and therefore demands a response. 
It is not true that the Appellant has contributed nothing to the support and child care of 
the minor children. 
It is fair to say, however, that there is significant child care expenses, since the Appellee 
moved the children to California, as she has been so caught up in her career, the children spend 
most of their waking hours in child care, since the Appellee is not there. 
It should be noted on the other hand, neither the Appellee's comments nor the 
Appellant's response is found in the record, and nowhere was the same considered at the lower 
court level, and hence both should be disregarded. 
It should be clear to everyone involved however that this matter absolutely will not be 
considered and resolved on the basis of sympathy or prejudice for one side or the other. 
The Appellee's Brief should be rejected by this Court because it does not comply with 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure throughout. 
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Counsel submits that the Rules apply across the board to everyone that appears before 
this Court, whether one is a single parent or an indigent prisoner, or whomever. 
There is good sound policy behind the Rules and the uniform application of the same, as 
they create not only an orderly administration of the appellate process, they also provide for an 
even playing field and a fair and foil adjudication on the merits. As all parties before this Court 
are equal, the Appellee should be treated the same as the next guy or gal. 
Counsel submits that there are fatal flaws to the Appellee's Brief, as follows: 
1. As noted throughout the Appellee's brief, the printing is wrong. Under Rule 27, of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the pages in the brief shall be double sided. 
Rule 27 (c) reads as follows: 
Binding. Briefs shall be printed on both sides of the page and bound with a compact-type 
binding so as not unduly to increase the thickness of the brief along the bound side. 
Coiled plastic and spiral type bindings are not acceptable. 
There is no attempt at all by the Appellee to comply with this Rule in any way. 
2. As noted throughout the Appellee's brief, the printing is wrong for another reason, as 
the printing shall be double spaced. 
Rule 27 (a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure reads as follows: 
(a) Paper size; printing margins. Briefs shall be type-written, printed or prepared by 
photocopying or other duplicating or copying process that will produce clear, black 
and permanent copies equally legible to printing, on opaque, unglued paper 8V2 inches 
wide and 11 inches long, and shall be securely bound along the left margin. Paper 
may be recycled paper, with or without deinking. The printing must be double 
spaced, except for matter customarily single spaced and indented. Margins shall be 
at least one inch on top, bottom and sides of each page. Page numbers may appear in 
the margins. 
In the Appellee's Brief the "sympathy statement" is single spaced. The next four (4) plus 
pages are single spaced. Much of the balance of the brief is inappropriately single spaced. 
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3. The Appellee ignores the rules that require one to cite the record when stating a fact or 
element of evidence in their briefs. 
It is fair to say under the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellee's briefs are 
different than Appellant's briefs. 
However, according to Rule 24 (b) the Appellee must cite the record just as much as any 
other party. 
24(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements 
of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include: 
(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with 
the statement of the appellant, or, 
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the 
appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
Hence, the Appellee must comply with all of the requirements that the Appellant must 
comply, except with reference to the statement of the issues and the addendum. 
As noted in Rule 24 (a) (9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure is the following: 
An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes and part of the record relied on. 
Also in Rule 24 (e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure is another reference to the 
rule that one must cite the record in their Briefs: 
(24) (e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages 
of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11 (b) or to pages of any 
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to 
Rule 11(f)or 11(g) . . . 
As noted in the Statement of Facts by the Appellee and then throughout the Appellee's 
Brief, Appellee makes little effort to cite the record for the facts that she asserts are relevant on 
appeal. 
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The Appellate Court will not consider any facts not properly cited to or supported by the 
record. See Uckerman vs. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. 588 P2d. 142,144 (Utah, 1978). 
Koulis vs. Standard Oil Co. 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), Steele vs. Board of Review of 
Industrial Commission, 845 P2d 960 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
4. On page 19 of the Appellee's Brief, she raises an issue and states multiple facts that 
are not only not referenced to the transcript, they were never found in the record at all, as she 
raises these facts for the first time on appeal. 
On page 19 is the following: 
There is also mention, to the effect, of the questions of Valerie's morale's, particularly in 
the work place. There were (2) affidavits submitted by Mr. and Mrs. Hill, submitted in 
the Appellant's Addendum, that suggests that Valerie had and would do anything in her 
power to move up with the company. Also, it suggests that she had done some 
suggestive acts at the work place. Keeping in mind that this is a major company, that is 
merged with several other companies, whose company policy, stated within the company 
handbook, that ANY sexual misconduct, of any kind, would be the grounds for 
immediate termination. So if these two managers had indeed seen or observed this, why 
was Valerie not terminated, as per company policy. These two affidavits, ring of a 
vendetta. Why were these two not called to testify, as well as any of the others that wrote , 
statements or affidavits." 
There was no testimony at the trial level about this being a major company. There was 
no testimony about this one merging with several other companies. There was no testimony 
regarding company policy or there being an employee handbook or anything else regarding 
sexual misconduct. 
These are claims made first here on appeal with no reference to the record and totally out 
of the sky, with no basis at all as to what was before the Lower Court. 
As a side note it is significant that Appellee does not deny the immoral conduct, and 
furthermore the reason why these folks were not called to testify is because the parties stipulated 
to the evidence coming in by way of affidavit. 
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However, the point here is that she can not ignore the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
and not only fail to cite the record, here she states that this as if there is some evidence of the 
same, when there is in fact none. 
This Court has long held that issues not raised before the lower Court will not be 
considered at the Appellate Level, unless there is plain error. State vs. Hansen, 540 P.2d 935 
(Utah, 1975), State vs. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
5. Appellee fails to comply with Rule 24 (a) (3) in reference to the Table of Authorities. 
According to Rule 24 (e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure the Appellee must 
cite in the Appellee's Brief the pages in the Table of Authorities: 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(3) A table of authorities with case alphabetically arranged with parallel 
citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with reference to the 
pages of the brief where they are cited. 
Here there is no effort to comply with this Rule and this like the other Rules cited 
includes mandatory language. 
The Rules are not suggestive in nature, nor are they put together as a recommendation or 
a nice way to prepare and file Briefs, rather the language is direct and absolute. 
The appellate courts have repeatedly noted that it will not accept as true factual 
allegations in briefs not properly cited to the record. See Uckerman vs. Lincoln National Life 
Insurance Co. 588 P2d. 142,144 (Utah, 1978). 
6. Lastly, the Appellee has failed to comply with the requirement regarding supplying 
this Court with a standard of review with supporting authority. 
According to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, in Rule 24 (a) (5) the Appellee must 
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submit with each issue raised the standard of review with supporting authority: 
24 (a) Brief of the Appellant. The brief of the Appellant shall contain under 
appropriate heading and in the order indicated: 
5) A statement of the issues presented for review including for each issue, 
the standard of appellate review with supporting authority. 
In reference to Argument Two, in the Appellee's Brief, she claims that the Appellant only 
made an effort to be there for the children after the August 5th Order to Show Cause and then she 
refers this Court to a wholly unrelated and immaterial battery of law regarding temporary orders, 
as her standard of appellate review. 
Again in Argument Three, the Appellee claims that Appellant was financially 
irresponsible and cites this Court to a battery of law regarding the lower Court having to pick 
between two excellent parents when deciding custody, as her standard of appellate review. 
Lastly in Argument Four, the Appellee claims that Appellant only addressed the concerns 
of the eldest of the three children and overlooked the younger two, then Appellee cites this Court 
to a battery of law regarding the code provisions regarding the feelings and the needs of the 
children, preferences of the child, etc., as her standard of appellate review. 
It is apparent that the Appellee merely took cases that were cited by her Attorney of 
Record at the trial level, and pulled the cases from the same, which have nothing to do with the 
issues on appeal. Note the Record at pages 124 through 128. 
The Standard of Review requirement in subsection (a)(5) should not be ignored as this 
requirement helps to focus the briefs and thereby promotes the accuracy and efficiency on 
appeal. Christensen vs. Mums, 812 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
There is a remedy built into the Rules when one disregards them, and it is found in Rule 
24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
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24 (j) Requirements and Sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented 
with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, 
irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be 
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess 
attorneys fees against the offending lawyer. 
The rational for such severe rules is that a "reviewing court is entitled to have the 
issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and not simply a depository in which the 
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research." State vs. Bishop, 753 P.2d 
439,450 (Utah, 1988). MacKav v. Hardy. 973 P.2d 941 (Utah 1998), State vs. Shepherd. 989 
P.2d 503 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
ARGUMENT TWO 
THE APPELLEE'S BRIEF MISLEADS THIS COURT 
1. As noted above, the Appellee misleads this Court in her sympathy statement 
regarding the payment by the Appellant of certain sums since the matter was heard by the Lower 
Court. As noted above, the Appellant has made significant payments to the Appellee. 
2. Statement of Fact #3, of the Appellee is most misleading. She states in the Brief that 
"The parties separated on May 23rd 1998 after a very violent and abusive marriage. Finding of 
Fact #26 at page 202 of the record." 
Appellant submits that this is most misleading, as the Lower Court did not make any such 
finding. 
The Lower Court found her testimony regarding the relationship questionable, as noted in 
the said Finding: 
"26. Sometime during May 1998, what had been a somewhat tumultuous time 
between the parties escalated in severity. On or about May 23,1998, the parties 
determined that they would physically separate. Mrs. Dunn described the parties 
circumstances as continual fighting to a point that Mr. Dunn was striking the 
home walls with his fist. After Mr. Dunn left the Roy, Utah home and went with 
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some of his belongings, Mrs. Dunn took her children and the only automobile 
owned by the parties and drove to California to be close to her family. She 
believed it was an issue of safety. She was afraid of Mr. Dunn. She claims, 
however, she did not want a divorce." 
Appellant submits that the Appellee clearly wants this Court to overlook the fact that she 
pursued her career and left the children here in Utah. 
In order to get this Court to buy off on the idea that she in fact went to California without 
the children, she must persuade this Court that there is a safety issue here, and she must go to 
California in order to be safe. 
Otherwise, this Court is left with the conclusion that she chose her career over the 
children. 
Hence, she claims on Appeal that there was a "very violent and abusive marriage." 
However, the Lower Court made no such finding, and in fact the finding itself suggests 
that she was less than credible regarding the breakup of the marriage. 
What she fails to tell this Court is that she prevented the Appellant from leaving, at the 
very time in which she claims that marriage was very violent and abusive. As noted on page 
441 of the Transcript she testified that she purchased a "club" so that the Appellant could not 
leave with the car. 
Not only did the Appellee not have to go to California, she did not have to leave the 
children at all. She could have obtained the same kind of job she had for many years and the 
exact same kind she went to California to pursue right here in Utah. 
There was no testimony that the Appellee made any attempt to locate work here in Utah 
so that she could be here with her children. Rather the evidence was disputed that California 
meant "career" and that was the reason for going to California, not because the "marriage had 
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become very violent and abusive." 
What is most telling about the situation is that the Appellee was granted joint custody of 
the minor children, should she want to stay with her children. 
However, the career was too tempting, she left, and now she tries to lead the Appellate 
Court, to believe that it was for reasons of a very violent and abusive marriage, which is just not 
true. 
It is true that the parties argued and Appellant struck the wall, however, there was never 
any testimony of any kind of violence or abuse of any kind between the parties, and hence the 
claims on appeal are most misleading. 
3. Again in Statement of Fact #4, Appellee misleads this Court regarding "anger and 
violence." 
This time she shows this Court no reference to any part of the Transcript or of the 
Record. She makes it up totally out of the sky. 
She states that she and the children moved to California, "to start a life where they were 
away from the element of anger and violence." 
It is obvious to Counsel for the Appellant, that the Appellee wants this Court to conclude 
that she had to go to California, for the safety of the little children. 
However, such was not the case. 
She stipulated in open Court with the assistance of Counsel, that Appellant would be 
awarded the temporary use and possession of the marital home, and that the children would 
remain here in Utah. 
In reality, it was by way of stipulation and it had nothing to do with anger and violence. 
She appeared in Court with her attorney, and she got exactly what she wanted, as she 
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agreed to the whole arrangement. 
Now to suggest that she had to go is most misleading. 
4. Appellee misleads this Court in reference to Statement of Fact #13, which states: 
"13. Mr. Dunn was found to have only to have made a sincere effort with the 
children after the Order to Show Cause Hearing on August 5th 1998, to try to 
prepare for trial." 
This is most misleading and totally overlooks all of the stipulated evidence found in the 
Affidavits. 
Appellant submits that the word "only" is misplaced here by the Appellee. It is not that 
the Appellant only took an interest after the Order to Show Cause Hearing, rather it should read 
that only the Appellant showed an interest in the well being of the children during all of the time 
in question. 
Appellant will not restate all of the evidence regarding the Appellee showing no interest 
in the children during their developmental years and refers this Court to the Blue Brief. 
Appellant submits that this Statement of Fact is again pulled right out of the sky, with no 
reference whatsoever to the Transcript or the Record. 
It is flat out not true and most misleading to this Court. 
5. Appellee misleads this Court in reference to Statement of Fact #14, which reads, 
"14. Mr. Dunn was found to have demonstrated a lack of financial responsibility 
due to unpaid taxes, home foreclosures, and unpaid back child support." 
Again, there is no reference whatsoever to where this is found in the Record or the 
Transcript. 
Appellant submits that there is some reference in Finding of Fact #41, to Mr. Dunn 
having a lack of financial responsibility. 
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Appellant submits that this is perhaps a bit unfair to say that in a setting where both 
parents work outside of the home, if there are financial problems it is the Father that is to blame. 
In reality, it was both parents that had problems making ends meet. In fact, it was the 
mother that had the foreclosure on the home she lived in, in Arizona not the Father. (Note 
Findings of Fact #12 and #13) 
As to the tax that Mr. Dunn brought into the marriage, he had a plan to pay it off, 
however, this did not happen because he and Mrs. Dunn spent this money on their new family. 
Note Transcript at 259 and following. 
As to the ORS debt it is true that this is for his daughter by prior marriage, however, it 
was both Mr. and Mrs. Dunn who decided how his paycheck would be spent. So it is unfair to 
say that he was somehow irresponsible when it came to the family finances, but she was 
responsible. 
This is especially the case where she is the one that works so much out of the home. She 
was the bread winner according to her testimony at trial. Note transcript at page 435. 
As noted in Dr. Craig Swanner's report, the roles had switched and she was the parent 
that was pursuing a career and Mr. Dunn was the one home nurturing the children. 
Hence, it is totally misleading to this Court to suggest that since there were financial 
problems, Mr. Dunn was irresponsible. 
What Appellee is arguing, it appears, is stereotypes. Mommies are homemakers and 
Daddies go to work. 
Surely this case should not be decided on gender. 
6. Appellee misleads this Court in reference to Statement of Fact #16 in Appellee's 
Brief. 
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Her Statement of Fact is as follows: 
"16. Mr. Dunn only learned to dress, bath, due his daughters hair, get ready for 
school, due homework with, and to care for his children, after the August 5th 
Order to Show Cause Hearing." 
This is absolutely false and has no basis in the record whatsoever. 
The stipulated Affidavits totally betrays this statement by the Appellee. 
Appellant submits that this is another case where the Appellee misplaces the "only" in the 
sentence. 
It should read," Only Mr. Dunn dressed, bathed, etc." That fact, relative to the August 
5th, Order to Show Cause, is actually undisputed. 
It is undisputed that only Mr. Dunn took care of the children after the Order to Show 
Cause hearing. Valerie Dunn admits the same throughout the trial as noted in the Blue Brief. 
7. Appellee misleads this Court in reference to the two younger children in Statement of 
Fact #17, which states: 
"Mr. Dunn totally disregards the very existence of the other two children 
throughout the trial." 
It is fair to say that the trial at the Lower Court focused on Shea, due to her learning 
disabilities and her special needs, and how the school, the teachers, the principals and only the 
Father were working on the same. 
It is not fair to say however that the other two children's "very existence" was "totally 
disregarded." 
Cory Dunn testified on pages 48 and 49 of the Transcript about his effort regarding the 
little boys room and making the same special for them. On page 71, Cory testified about how all 
of the children climb on his bed at night when they talk about what they did during the day. On 
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page 74, Cory testified about getting bikes from D.I. for the children. On page 84, Cory testified 
about his efforts with all of the children during a typical day. On page 85, Cory testified with 
excitement about the progress of McKenzie, and his development in school. 
Appellant could go on and on about the testimony of Cory and his concerns and his 
successes with the little boys, however, Appellant will merely refer this Court to the Appellant's 
Blue Brief. 
Bottom line, however, is that it is very misleading to this Court to state in a Statement of 
Fact that Cory Dunn totally disregarded the very existence of his little boys at the time of trial. 
8. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Appellee argues to this Court that she was the 
primary care giver, when the same was just not the case. 
As noted throughout the Blue Brief, it was Mr. Dunn that took care of the day to day 
needs of the children, while Valerie Dunn pursued her career. 
Appellee can not dispute that she picked "California" and "Career" over "Children". 
She had joint custody here in Utah, and she abandoned the same and went to California 
without the children for a full sixteen months. 
Such is the truth and not even disputed. 
However, her argument that she was the primary care giver suggests a different meaning 
to the word "primary." 
In her brief she points out that Cory would go to work early or late, depending on 
Valerie's schedule. 
In her brief she points out that everything revolved around her, and she was the focus of 
the schedules of all of the rest of the family. 
Hence, her schedule was "primary" and everyone else's schedule revolved around it. 
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But that is not the meaning of "primary" when considering who has been the "primary 
caregiver." 
Beginning on page 3 of the Appellee's Brief, she points out, verbatim from the 
Transcript, how Mr. Dunn changed his work so he could have more flexibility in taking care of 
the children. 
She claims therein that everyone worked around her schedule, which is true. However, 
that does not make her the "primary caregiver." 
Her entire first argument supports the fact that Mr. Dunn was the primary care giver 
rather than the other way around. 
Appellant submits that what is absolutely clear from the First Argument as portrayed by 
the Appellee is that everything and everyone revolved around her job. 
There is not a shred of evidence that Valerie did anything to work around the needs of the 
kids for school, etc., it was one-hundred per cent Cory that changed his schedules to get the 
children where they needed to be. 
A careful review of Appellee's First Argument will bear out this exact point. 
Valerie's career came first, and that was "primary" and everyone and everything revolved 
around her job. 
It is undisputed throughout each of the briefs, that Valerie's Career was the "primary 
focus" of Valerie. Her red brief, absolutely confirms the same, as there is no where in her Brief 
where she pointed out that her "career" took a second place to anything else in the parties lives. 
Nowhere in her brief, does she direct this Court to look at the record and see where she 
placed anything above her career. 
Rather what she does do, and in this case verbatim, is show this Court how Cory Dunn 
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worked around her schedule and how the family all worked around her career. 
Nowhere in the red brief is a single shred of evidence showing this Court that there was 
anything that was more "primary" to Valerie Dunn than her career, her schedule and her moving 
up the corporate ladder. 
Valerie's quoting of the transcript bears this out in every single incidence. 
The statement of the claim itself suggests that Valerie would want this Court to believe 
that she was in fact the primary caregiver. 
However, the transcripts that she quotes bear out the exact opposite point. 
The quotes that she makes show two things: (1) Cory was there and changed his 
schedule to take care of the children, and (2) there was nothing more important to Valerie Dunn 
than Valerie's schedule and career. 
Appellant submits that the universal evidence at the trial level, excluding Valerie's own 
testimony, conclusively established that Cory Dunn was the primary caregiver. 
Now on appeal, the exact same is true, except that Valerie shows this Court in the record 
why her claims are without merit, as she shows this Court in the different quotes, how everyone 
worked around her career and how Cory was there and changed his schedule so that nothing 
would interfere with Valerie being to work as per her schedule. 
On appeal, Counsel submits that all of the evidence pointed out both by the Appellant and 
the Appellee supports the claims by the Appellant that "Valerie's primary focus was her career" 
and "Cory's primary focus was his children." 
ARGUMENT THREE 
SEVERAL OF THE APPELLANT'S 
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ARGUMENTS ARE UNCONTESTED IN APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
In the Blue Brief, Appellant raises five (5) issues on appeal. Many of the contentions and 
arguments raised therein go uncontested by the Appellee in her Appellee's brief. 
In Argument One of the Blue Brief, Appellant argued that the standard that the Lower 
Court must follow, is that of what is in the best interests of the children. 
Appellant pointed out that the children were well adjusted and doing well in every aspect 
of their lives. 
Appellant quoted from 30-3-10 of the Utah Code Annotated as amended in 1998, which 
provides; 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated or their marriage is 
declared void or dissolved the court shall make an order for the future care and 
custody of the minor children as it considers appropriate. In determining custody, 
the court shall consider the best interests of the child and the past conduct and 
demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties. 
In response to the foregoing the Appellee, first, fails to show this Court how a move to 
California would at all benefit the minor children and how that could possibly be in their best 
interests. 
The Lower Court found that the children were thriving in Utah. 
There is no basis to ignore the Dr.'s prescription for the well being of the minor children 
and move them to California. 
Now, that the Appellee has had an opportunity in which to respond to the same, there is 
still no reference nor hint whatsoever that would justify moving a child with special needs to 
California when that child, and all of the children, for that matter, were thriving in Utah. 
Counsel for the Appellant submits that there is no basis whatsoever for the Lower Court 
to totally ignore the doctor's prescription as found in the Psychological Report. This report was 
16 
based upon objective findings and several batteries of tests. 
It was error for the Lower Court to ignore the health issues raised in the evaluation, 
particularly as the same applied to Shea's mental and emotional health. 
Appellee suggests in her brief that Shea was a different person than either party knew and 
therefore Dr. Swanner's report was meaningless. 
The problem with the Appellee's position is that Dr. Swanner's report was not created in 
a vacuum. 
Rather, the report was consistent with everyone's assessment of Shea. 
Surely the Appellee would not deny that Shea is in a specialized program to assist her 
where Shea has critical needs. 
Frankly it is absurd for the Appellee to claim that since Shea was different than what Dr. 
Swanner reported, that Swanners recommendation was out the window. 
It is undisputed before this Court that this child has improved and succeeded in her 
catching up significantly with the mother completely off the scene. 
Valerie admitted, as noted in the Blue Brief that she has done nothing for this child for 
the past sixteen months. Yet during that sixteen months the child grew in leaps and bounds 
academically and felt wonderful about herself. 
Hence, at the time of trial it was a different child than what was reported in the 
recommendation from Dr. Swanner. Shea had not caught up to her regular class yet, but was 
thriving and succeeding, all with the mother off the scene. Hence, the idea that Shea was not the 
child Dr. Swanner diagnosed is true, but it was not because Shea was not a special needs child 
and it surely was not because Shea's mother had anything to do with it. 
Rather the child was succeeding and thriving in her special needs programs, because of 
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what Cory had done and there was absolutely no basis for the Lower Court to totally ignore the 
Dr.'s prescription and remove the Children from their home in Utah. 
This was particularly so when the Doctor concluded that it would be harmful to the 
children to do so. 
2. It is undisputed with the Appellee, that the Lower Court ignored the past seventeen 
months in deciding the custody issue. 
On page 10 and following of the Blue Brief, the Appellant pointed out that the Lower 
Court completely ignored the past seventeen or so months, regarding the conduct of the parties, 
in determining custody. 
Appellant made some pretty bold claims, i.e.: that Valerie agreed to the terms of the 
Court order for the seventeen months; that the Lower Court did not even consider this time and 
expressly decided not to consider the time; that Valerie never inquired once with Cory regarding 
how the children were developing in school; that Valerie Dunn had not made a single contact 
with school teachers teaching spelling, language and reading to Shea during the time in question; 
that Valerie had not made a single contact with Janet Afton Meyer, Shea's math teacher, during 
all of the time in question; and many others. 
In fact on page 18 of the Blue Brief, Appellant quoted the Appellee regarding the parties 
special needs child, as follows: 
A. (By Valerie Dunn) I never made a phone call to the math teacher, to answer your 
question. 
Q. (By Mr. Walsh) And she said that was the case for two years, is that true? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that's because you're too far away, huh? 
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A. I guess that's one way you can look at it. 
Appellant submits that what is so compelling now after we have the Appellee's Brief, is 
that not a shred of the foregoing is at all disputed by the Appellee. 
Appellee, not once, states anywhere in her red brief that something was misconstrued or 
misstated or misleading in any way. 
All of the foregoing is undisputed. 
Counsel refers this Court to the case of Paryzek vs. Paryzek 776 P.2d 78 (Utah App. 
1989) in his Blue Brief. 
Appellant submits that this Case is right on point. In this case the Lower Court ignored 
the time that the temporary order was in place, and the Court of Appeals held that such was 
reversible error. 
Here the claim is not even refuted by the Appellee. 
From a policy standpoint it is apparent to the Appellant that the "conduct of the parties" 
is the best measure of evidence before the Court. 
Day in and day out folks say all kinds of things, but the conduct, and particularly the 
conduct over time, speaks volumes. 
Here, the Career in California was more important than the custody of the children in 
Utah. 
Valerie chose to go to California and pursue her career. She left the kids here, and her 
conduct screams out the conclusion that she could not care less. 
As noted above, the State Legislature mandated that the "court shall consider the best 
interests of the child and the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the 
parties." 
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Appellant submits that it was error for the Lower Court to disregard the past seventeen or 
so months immediately preceding the trial in this action. 
3. Appellee totally ignores the severity of Shea's learning disability. 
Appellee states repeatedly in her red brief, that Shea is not the person that Dr. Swanner 
saw. 
Appellant will not restate all of the reasons as to why Valerie has ignored this problem to 
this point, but merely refer this Court to Argument Three in the Blue Brief. 
What Counsel finds most alarming is that the red brief screams of denial. 
According to Valerie - Shea does not have a problem. 
Valerie admitted at trial that Shea was in a specialized education course, involving core 
subjects. Note Blue Brief. 
Valerie, admitted at the time of trial that Shea has had the problem since at least 
kindergarten. Note Blue Brief. 
However, now Shea does not have a problem, as Dr. Swanner saw a different Shea than 
what was portrayed by the parties at trial. 
Appellee could not be more bold about the fact that Shea does not need anything and will 
be just fine. 
The message between the lines could not be more apparent. The mother here has a career 
to pursue, so Shea will be just fine. Look at how well she has done while I was in California. 
There is no reason why she can not succeed in California. 
Appellant submits that it could not be more apparent that Valerie treats Shea as having no 
special needs and the only one around here that has special needs is Valerie. She needs to reach 
up that corporate ladder, whether the same is good for the children or not. 
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4. The Appellee has left unchallenged the claim by the Appellant that a move to 
California would be detrimental to the children. 
As noted above the Lower Court "shall consider the best interests of the child(ren)" Note 
30-3-10 Utah Code Annotated, as amended in 1998. 
There is no evidence to support the idea that it is in the best interests of the minor 
children to remove them from Utah. 
Here they are thriving. 
The Dr. prescription was to the effect that a move would be harmful. 
Hence, why the move? 
It was clearly an abuse of discretion to remove the children from Utah to California. 
Now with the benefit of the Appellee's Brief, it becomes all the more obvious, as the 
Appellee has not refuted in any way that the move to California would be harmful to the 
children. 
Hence, it is now unrefuted before this Court that it would not be in the best interest of the 
children to move them to California as the Appellee has not produced a shred of evidence to 
support the idea that it be good for the children to move them to California particularly in the 
face that at least one of the children is a special needs child in a special program designed just for 
her, and the others are not only well adjusted in Utah, they are thriving here. 
SUMMARY 
Typically it is a difficult measure to have an Appellate Court overturn a Lower Court's 
Finding of Fact. 
Usually the reason for that is that the Lower Court can see the demeanor of the witness 
on the stand and can best determine the credibility as the one on the scene. 
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Appellant submits that for several reasons such is not the case here in this Appeal. 
First, most of the corroborative evidence was stipulated to by Counsel from the 
Respondent. 
There are Affidavits from most everyone that the parties associated with both at home 
and at work. 
Each of these Affidavits were not only stipulated to, they were unchallenged. These 
Affidavits came into evidence and there was no dispute as to what each witness said under oath. 
These Affidavits covered evidence regarding the parties over the course of years in some cases. 
They covered Valerie's morals at work and how she was willing to do anything in order to move 
up the corporate ladder. All of the same was brought into evidence by stipulation and considered 
by the Lower Court. 
Hence there is no need to defer to the Lower Court regarding this mountain of evidence, 
as this Court can review the Affidavits just as easily as the Trial Court and there is no need to 
defer in any way regarding the same. 
Second, much of the Appellant's case is founded on the undisputed conduct of the 
parties. 
Here Valerie was granted joint custody of the children and could have freely participated 
in their lives here in Utah, but chose to pursue her career in California. This is all undisputed. 
Here Valerie took absolutely no part whatsoever in the children's lives during the 
seventeen or so months prior to trial. This conduct is not disputed in any way. 
Valerie testified that during this seventeen or so months she had not made a single 
contact with the school to assist the children with their education. She made a single contact 
once, but that was to gather evidence for trial, and had nothing to do with the children's 
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development and success in school. 
Here it is undisputed that Shea was in a specialized program to help her with core 
subjects. Subjects that everyone would agree are critical to the success and happiness of Shea in 
the future. 
Valerie takes claim for putting Shea in this program as she attended one of the initial 
meetings to arrange the same. 
It is undisputed that Valerie participated in the initial decision to land the family in the 
Roy, Utah area. She helped pick out the home site where there would be children of the same age 
as her children; she helped pick the schools, the neighborhood, etc. 
She can hardly be critical of her own actions in this regard and does not attempt the same 
either at the Lower Court level nor on Appeal. 
It is undisputed that all three of the parties minor children are well adjusted and thriving 
in Roy, Utah. 
It is undisputed that the Child Custody Evaluator was more than a mere social worker, 
rather he was a Doctor of Psychology. 
It is undisputed that he made objective findings and administered a variety of tests and 
made a prescription for the well being of the children, and particularly for Shea, a child with 
special mental health needs. 
It is undisputed that the Dr.'s prescription was that it was not only in the best interests for 
the minor children to remain with the father in Roy, Utah, but that it would be harmful to remove 
them to California. 
It was his unequivocal prescription for the well being of the children, that they remain in 
Utah. 
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Perhaps the most important piece of evidence is found in the school witnesses. 
Each of them see the child during all aspects of their lives. They see the child on rainy 
days, and on days filled with sunshine. They see the child when they have a bad hair day and 
when they shine. They see what is really going on, not just a few sessions when one is on their 
best behavior and putting on a show, for purposes of an evaluation. 
They see the horizon everyday of the child's life for days and days, weeks, and months 
and in some cases even years. Many of the school witnesses observed years with the child. 
They see first hand which parent is genuinely concerned about the children, and which 
one gives the child's development and success the appropriate attention and focus that it needs 
and deserves. 
They see everything, and they come into Court perfectly unbiased, as their training and 
their life's work is to help a child develop and grow and succeed. 
Counsel submits that there is no better barometer than a teacher to tell the court about a 
child's needs. No one is better suited to give the Court the pure evidence of what is going on in 
the child's life. 
At least, two of the school witnesses were called to testify by the Respondent. 
It is absolutely undisputed that every school witness, teacher, principal or whoever, 
testified that Cory Dunn could not be more interested and active in the children's development 
and Valerie Dunn could not be less interested. 
All of the evidence by the school witnesses was unrefuted by the mother. 
Hence, there is no need for this Court to defer to the trial judge in any way in reference to 
the teachers, special education specialists and the principal, as no one challenged what they had 
to say in any way. 
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Such is the case both at the Trial Court level and now on Appeal. 
Bottom line, there is no need to defer to the Trial Judge on the issue of Custody. 
CONCLUSION 
Counsel respectfully submits that this matter was decided on the basis of gender. He 
referenced the same in the Blue Brief, but now that he has observed in detail the Brief of 
Appellee, Counsel is convinced that such was the basis for this decision. 
"Mommies nurture and Daddies go to work, and little children need to be with their 
mothers as that is only natural." 
As a matter of law, gender can not be the basis for determination of Custody. Beginning 
with Pusev vs. Pusev, 728 P. 2d 117, (Utah 1986) the law of the State of Utah prohibits gender 
as being on the basis for a determination of custody. 
Counsel for the Appellant respectfully submits that there is no other explanation, as all 
evidence with the exception of Valerie's testimony absolutely points to one conclusion and that 
is the Cory Dunn has been the primary caregiver and he should be granted the sole, permanent 
care, custody and control of the parties minor children. Valerie's testimony was not only 
unsubstantiated, it was inconsistent with the tax returns, etc. and more importantly her own 
conduct. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Lower Court and remand with 
instructions to grant the permanent care, custody and control of the min 
Dated this / of March, 2001 
Y FOR THE APPELLANT 
25 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT to the Respondent/Appellee by mailing the same in the 
United States Mails, postage fully prepaid addressed to VALERIE DUNN, 5 MARCIA WAY, 
#62, ROSEVILLE, CALIFORNIA, 95747. 
Dated this £ZL day of March, 2001 
JOHN/WALSH 
ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT 
y 
26 
